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In Garnell v. Mount Sinai Hospital,153 the Appellate Division,
Second Department, unanimously reversed an order for a new trial
based on the alleged partiality of two jurors in a medical malpractice
action where the infant plaintiff had suffered permanent brain damage
as a result of an excessive administration of demerol to her mother
prior to delivery. The jury found for the defendant doctor and against
the defendant hospital on the negligence question. The appellate division reversed as to the hospital and ordered a new trial.15 4 Three
months later the plaintiffs moved for a new trial as to the doctor,
alleging that on voir dire examination one juror failed to disclose that
her nephew and niece were in the medical profession, and that another
concealed the fact that he had a retarded granddaughter. The trial
court granted the plaintiffs' motion.
The appellate division justified its reversal of the order on several
grounds. With respect to the juror with relatives in the medical profession, the court found the evidence insufficient to show nondisclosure
on voir dire.15 5 The other juror's bias, if any, was regarded as favorable
to the plaintiffs. 50 The court, emphasizing the strong public policy
against a jury's post-trial impeachment of its own verdict, 5 7 concluded
that the plaintiffs' delay of over two years, after learning of the possible
juror prejudice and until an unfavorable disposition on appeal, precluded them from asserting the claim. 58
ARTIcLE

62 -

ATrACHMENT

CPLR art. 62: Ex parte atttachment in an action based on conversion
held unconstitutional.
Recent consumer litigation has exposed provisional remedies as
the procedural area most vulnerable to constitutional challenge on due
process grounds. 59 Traditionally among the most potent weapons of
the creditor, provisional remedies have become increasingly subject to
153 40 App. Div. 2d 1010, 339 N.Y.S.2d 31 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
154 34 App. Div. 2d 981, 312 N.YS.2d 629 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
15540 App. Div. 2d at 1011, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33.
156 Id., 339 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
157 Id. at 1012, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34, citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915). The
court indicated that the post-trial indictment of the jury was orchestrated by a juror and
the infant's parents.
15840 App. Div. 2d at 1011, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 33, citing Empire Crafts Corp. v. Grace
China Co., 40 Misc. 2d 957, 244 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1963), aff'd mem.,
20 App. Div. 2d 851, 249 N.Y.S.2d 664 (2d Dep't 1964).
159 The provisional remedies are: attachment, arrest, preliminary injunction, receivership, and notice of pendency. CPLR 6001. Seizure of a chattel in a replevin action is
technically not a provisional remedy, but is usually treated as one. See CPLR 203(b)(3),
6001.
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the careful scrutiny of courts more readily disposed to strike a new
constitutional balance in the creditor-debtor relationship. As a result,
the constitutionality of many of New York's provisional remedies has
been cast in serious doubt.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,160 the United States Supreme
Court commenced the process of reevaluation by declaring the ex parte
garnishment of 50% of a debtor's wages violative of the due process
clause. While acknowledging that ex parte procedures could conceivably meet due process requirements in "extraordinary" situations, the
Court held that, absent such circumstances, the defendant must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the attachment
of his salary.1 1
While some courts of other jurisdictions liberally construed the
Court's holding as applicable to other provisional remedies, 16 2 the
initial New York reaction to Sniadach was mixed. A three-judge federal
court for New York's Northern District, in Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 163 struck down as unconstitutional the New York re-

plevin statute, article 71 of the CPLR, primarily on the ground that
seizure of the defendant's chattel upon a mere requisition constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure in violati6n of the fourth amendment. On the due process issue, the court acknowledged that Sniadach
required that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given to the
defendant, but indicated that creditors might also satisfy due process by
presenting to a judicial officer the circumstances allegedly justifying
ex parte action. 164 The Legislature responded by amending CPLR 7102
to require an order of seizure "to conform to the due process of law
requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the
United States," 165 but did not mandate notice prior to seizure of a
defendant's goods.
The New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the principles
160 395 U.S. 337 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 561,
580 (1972).
161 Id.at 339.
162 See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972). Randone struck down the California
ex parte attachment procedure under CAr. CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 537(1) (West Supp. 1971) on
the basis of Sniadach.
1683
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's
L.REv. 561, 585 (1972).
164 Id. at 724.
165 L. 1971, ch. 1051, § 1, eff. July 2, 1971. Governor Rockefeller expressed dissatisfaction with the measure in his accompanying memorandum primarily due to the absence of
clear standards for applying due process requirements. See 2 MCKINNEY'S SESSION LAWs OF
NEw YoRK 2641 (1971). See generally Gardner, Fuentes v.Shevin: The New York Creditor
and Replevin, 22 BurFFALO L. REV. 17, 27-28 (1972).
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of Sniadach liberally to all ex parte seizures of property under ordinary
circumstances, preferring instead to interpret its holding narrowly. In
300 West 154th Street Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings,'6" the
Court, perhaps influenced by the facts, read Sniadach as requiring a
prior judicial hearing only when "special irreversible economic hard67

ships" are involved.1

16
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin'
clarified Sniadach, holding that procedural due process requires notice
and a hearing before the defendant "is deprived of any significant
property interest ... ."169 At a pre-seizure hearing the creditor must
demonstrate the "probable validity" of his claim. 170 The Court reiterated that "'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing"'171 may exist, but characterized such situations as "truly unusual." The availability of ex parte remedies was
restricted to situations where such action was necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest, such as the acquisition of jurisdiction, 7 2 or to special situations demanding prompt
action, such as cases where a creditor "could make a showing of imx7
mediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods.'

16626 N.Y.2d 538, 260 NXE.2d 534, 311 N.YS.2d 899 (1970).
167 Id. at 544, 260 NXE.2d .at 537, 311 N.YS.2d at 903. The appellant therein was a
landlord who challenged the constitutionality of N.Y.C. ADMm. CoDE §§ 564-15.0 to
564-31.0 (1970). He alleged that Sniadach forbade the payment of rent by his tenants to
the Department of Buildings without a hearing as to his liability for a blocked toilet.
168 407 US. 67 (1972). For a discussion of the background of Fuentes, see Abbott &
Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services
Program, 57 Iowa L. REy. 955 (1972).
169 407 US. at 82, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 379 (1971); see Note,
Boddie and Beyond: Rights of the Indigen.t in Civil Actions, 18 CATH. LAw. 67 (1972).
170407 U.S. at 97, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
171407 US. at 90. The Court in the past has upheld ex parte seizure in limited cases;
see Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 39 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 US. 245 (1947) (bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (tax revenue); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 US. 29
(1928) (bank failure); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (attachment necessary to
secure jurisdiction); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 US. 306 (1908) (seizure
of contaminated food). But see McKay v. McInnes, 279 US. 820 (1929), aff'g per euriam
127 Me. 110, 141 A, 699 (1928), in which summary attachment was upheld. The Court in
Fuentes limited application of McKay to factual situations similar to Coffin and Ownbey.
407 U.S. at 91 n.28.
172 See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US. 94 (1921).
173 407 US. at 93. The Court enumerated the principles which have been used to
justify ex parte seizure of property:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need
for very prompt action. Third. the State has kept strict control over its monopoly
of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
Id. at 91.
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In order to satisfy due process, -any statute permitting ex parte seizure
must be "narrowly drawn."
The New York attachment statute, article 62 of the CPLR, provides the provisional remedy by which the plaintiff seizes the defendant's property within the state prior to judgment. Attachment serves
two distinct but interrelated purposes: the attached property (1)
provides a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, 174 or (2) secures the
collection of a future judgment. Under CPLR 6201, an order of attachment may, in the court's discretion, 17 5 be issued in any action, other
than a matrimonial actionyl6 in which the plaintiff seeks a money judgment and shows adequate jurisdictional or security grounds. 177
CPLR 6201 must be read with the other sections of article 62
to determine the applicable procedures for securing an attachment
order. CPLR 6212 requires the plaintiff to show that a cause of action
-exists, and CPLR 6202 allows the court in its discretion to grant the
motion 'without notice to the defendant.
The statutory procedure for obtaining an ex parte order of attachment inan action based on conversion was recently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, Albany County, in Richman v. Rich174 See generally Comment, Foreign Attachment After. Sniadach and Fuentes, 73
COLUM. L. R . 342 (1973).
175 See

Tread RP. 144; 7B McKiuNEY's CPLR 6212, supp. commentary at 27 (1967);

H. WAor=,

NEw YoRK PRAcrxc

UNDER THE CPLR 186 (3d ed. 1970); 7A WK&M

6201.03 and the cases cited therein.
176 Matrimonial actions were excluded for policy reasons; see THu REP. 143.
17 See CPLR 6201:
§ 6201. Grounds for attachment
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial
action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in
part, or in the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants,
when:
1. the defendant is a foreign corporation or not a resident or domiciliary of
the state; or
2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be personally
served despite diligent efforts to do so; or
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid the serviceof summons, has departed or is about to depart from the state, or keeps himself
concealed therein; or
4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has ass*gned, disposed
of or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any of these
acts; or
5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has been
guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability; or
6. the action" is based upon the wrongful receipt, conversion, or the aiding or
abetting thereof, of any property held or owned by any governmental agency, including a municipal or public corporation, or officer thereof; or
7. the cause of action is based on a judgment, decree or order of a court of
the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit
in this state, or on a judgment which qualifies for recognition under the provisions of article 53; or
8. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the conversion of personal
property, or for fraud or deceit.
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man.178 Attachment had been secured under CPLR 6201(8) by the
plaintiff who alleged the conversion by his wife of substantial sums of
money and negotiable instruments. The court found that since notice
and an opportunity to be heard had not been afforded the defendant,
the seizure of her property fell directly within the constitutional ban of
Sniadach and Fuentes. The court was unable to find any "foreseeable
important governmental or public interest or 'unusual' situations which
would warrant a denial of a prehearing" as to the attachment. 179 Since
this basic condition was not satisfied, the court apparently found it unnecessary to decide whether the statute was narrowly drawn.
There are significant differences between article 62 and the procedures struck down in Fuentes. Even in ex parte proceedings, article 62
requires the plaintiff to show a cause of action and the applicable
grounds for attachment before a judicial officer.180 The court, in its
discretion, may or may not issue the order. The statutes in question
in Fuentes, however, required no such judicial interposition, but authorized the summary seizure of the defendant's property merely on
the filing with a clerk or prothonotary of an affidavit of value' or a
complaint reciting in a conclusory fashion that the plaintiff was entitled
82
to the property.
In practice, however, the differences are more apparent than real.
Adjudications that the cause of action was insufficient to support the
attachment are usually made after the fact of the seizure. Orders of
attachment ordinarily issue upon little more than a facial showing of
88
the plaintiff's case.
In any event, the Fuentes Court's insistence on notice and a
178 72 Misc. 2d 803, 339 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1972).
179 Id. at 806, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 592. A similar motion to vacate an attachment order
based on conversion was denied in an unreported case, Francis L duPont & Co. v. Springer,
168 N.Y.LJ. 88, Nov. 8, 1972, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
180 For a discussion of the evidentiary requirements to support an attachment order,
see, e.g., Zenith Bathing Pavilion, Inc. v. Fair Oaks SS. Corp., 240 N.Y. 307, 148 N.E. 532
(1925).
181 407 U.S. at 78.
182

Id. at 73-78.

183 See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 46970, 209 N.E2d 68, 85, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 29, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965) (Van Voorhis, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted):
[u1n cases where jurisdiction is obtained by attachment, the affidavits to procure
which must show "that there is a cause of action," the power "to grant an attachment does not depend upon predetermination of the merits of the action or plain.
tiff's prospects of success therein." Although evidentiary facts must be shown, it
has been said by this court that "The jurisdiction to grant an attachment does
not, we think, involve a preliminary determination by the officer to whom application for the writ is made whether in law the case presented by the complaint will
entitle the plaintiff to the relief he asks." "It is enough that as to a major portion
of their claim we cannot say as a matter of law on this record that the plaintiffs
must ultimately be defeated."
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hearing prior to a deprivation of property necessitates a complete reexamination of the constitutional validity of the ex parte order of
attachment authorized by article 62. While the integrated nature of
CPLR 6201 must be kept in mind, it will be useful for purposes
of evaluation to examine separately the two basic functions of the
statute.
The jurisdictional grounds for attachment, CPLR 6201 (1) and (2),
come within the "extraordinary situations" exception to the requirements of prior notice and a hearing, as the Court in Fuentes specifically
characterized "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state
court" as "clearly a most basic and important public interest."ls 4 A
fair reading of Fuentes indicates that the term "necessary" must be
construed literally, i.e., absolutely necessary, rather than merely useful
or convenient. If in personam jurisdiction cannot be acquired over a
foreign corporation or a defendant who is neither a resident nor a domiciliary, CPLR 6201(1) would then be literally necessary to the maintenance of the plaintiff's cause of action. If CPLR 302 is available, the
plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed concurrently under GPLR
6201(1) for ex parte attachment.
It is unlikely that ex parte attachment under CPLR 6201(2), as
presently written, could survive a constitutional test of necessity under
Fuentes. CPLR 301 and 313 provide adequate bases for securing in
personam jurisdiction over an unavailable state domiciliary. A defendant who is merely a resident presents a different problem. If in
personam jurisdiction cannot be acquired in the case of an unavailable
state resident who is not a domiciliary, attachment under GPLR 6201
(2) is necessary to provide a basis for jurisdiction. In this case, ex parte
attachment should be permissible as an exception to Fuentes.
CPLR 6201(7) permits attachment in actions to enforce a sister
state judgment under article 54 or a foreign state judgment under
article 53. If the judgment of a sister state is entitled to full faith and
credit," 5 it may be registered under article 54 and will be enforced as
if it were a New York judgment. The statute does not, however,
provide a basis for jurisdiction over the defendant. 186 It would seem,
184 407 US. at 91 n.23. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US. 94 (1921).

185 Whether a sister state judgment is entitled to full faith and credit is a federal
constitutional issue. For the appropriate standards used by the Supreme Court in determining this question, see Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (1931).
186 It is arguable that the full faith and credit clause dispenses with the need for obtaining new jurisdiction in New York once jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant by a sister state. This is a radical departure from the traditional concept of jurisdiction; cf. McLaughlin, Civil Practice,22 SyRAcusE L. REv. 55, 57 (1971). Article 54, without
more, may therefore be unconstitutional.
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therefore, that CPLR 6201(7) is necessary to provide a basis for jurisdiction to enforce the sister state judgment in New York.* Similarly,
conversion of a foreign state judgment into a New York judgment
under the provisions of article 53 requires a jurisdictional basis.,8 7 Ex
parte attachment under CPLR 6201(7) retains its constitutional validity
to serve these limited ends.
The security provisions originally proposed by the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, now CPLR 6201(3) and (4), were
included to afford plaintiffs assurance that a judgment would be colIectible from a defendant in situations deemed likely to involve a substantial basis for creditor insecurity. 188 The Advisory Committee
refused to include the substance of CPA 903(4)-(6), the predecessors of
CPLR 6201(5), (6), and (8), in the new attachment statute on the basis
that an allegation of fraud should not be a ground for attachment.' 89
However, the final revision of CPLR 6201 included the substance of
CPLR 6201(5), (6), and (8), with the explanation that the "new paragraphs are required in a case where attachment of the very funds which
have been wrongfully received is the only effective remedy..."10
To meet the consitutional requirements of Fuentes, the availability of ex parte procedures must be confined to extraordinary situations as authorized by a narrowly drawn statute. Clearly, any statute
which serves a security purpose does not perforce fulfill the conditions set down by Fuentes. The Court offered only an extremely
limited example, i.e., "cases in which a creditor could make a showing
of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed
9
goods."' '
CPLR 6201(3) and (4) share a basic security interest: subsection
(3) deals with the defendant's making himself unavailable, while subsection (4) deals with the defendant's making his property unavailable.
However, Fuentes recognizes no such distinction, but permits ex parte
proceedings only when the existence or availability of property is
threatened. Thus, while the situations contemplated by subsection (3)
must necessarily fall within the scope of those requiring prior notice
and a hearing, ex parte attachment pursuant to CPLR 6201(4) retains
its validity as a narrowly drawn exception to the Fuentes rule.
CPLR 6201(5) allows attachment in an action on a contract in
187 This was the primary reason for enacting subdivision (7); see 7B McKun

6201, supp. commentary at 14 (1970).
188 See generally Tnam REp. 147-48; S=mr REP. 576.
189 TmD REP. 147.
190 Fn-m REP. 150.
191 407 US. at 93.

y's CPLR
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which the plaintiff alleges fraud. CPLR 6201(8) allows attachment in
cases based on the torts of conversion, fraud, or deceit. Both of these
shbsections were originally excluded by the Advisory Committee as
overly broad, 192 and neither involves an immediate danger to property.
In Richman, the court struck down the ex parte attachment procedure
based on subdivision (8) with respect to conversion, and there is little
reason to assume that the other grounds allowed by these subsections
are of any greater constitutional validity.
CPLR 6201(6) also involves no immediate danger to the property
in question, but authorizes attachment in all cases in which peculation
is alleged. While the Advisory Committee did not include this subsection in the original proposed statute,'9 the Supreme Court has
allowed summary seizure of property when necessary to secure the
public revenue.'" Consequently, CPLR 6201(6) remains available as
a valid ground for ex parte attachment.
Fuentes, then, poses a fundamental challenge to ex parte attachment procedures in New York. No longer will a plaintiff be permitted
to deprive a defendant of his property merely upon a perfunctory
showing of the elements of a cause of action.195 Due process under
192 See TsmD REP. 147.
198 Id. 148.
194 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 US. 589 (1931). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
91 (1972).
195 Other ex parte seizures of property or temporary deprivations of rights to the
use of property may be examined briefly for compliance with the due process requirements
of Fuentes. For example, replevin under article 71 dearly must be reformed to provide
for notice and a hearing in conformity with its requirements. A valid exception for situations in which goods are endangered can be provided in a manner similar to CPLR 6201(4).
The Court's strong concern for the preservation of the defendant's due process rights
with respect to his property can readily be extrapolated into eventual disapproval of ex
parte arrest under CPLR 6101(1). Arrest at law is available in an action to recover damages for the conversion of personal property, or for fraud or deceit. Compare CPLR 6101(1)
with CPLR 6201(8). The inclusion of subdivision (8) in the attachment statute was jutified
by the existence of CPLR 6101(1); see RFFH REP. 150. If attachment under these grounds
is unconstitutional, the more drastic remedy of ex parte arrest under the same grounds is
dearly unconstitutional. CPLR 6101(1) should therefore be repealed. See, e.g., 7B McKN4EY's CPLR 6101, supp. commentary at 9 (1964); 7 WK&M
6101.02.
CPLR 6313 provides that a temporary restraining order may, in the court's discretion, be granted without notice to the defendant if the plaintiff, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, can show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damages would
otherwise result. When the action sought to be restrained endangers the defendant's property interests, it would appear that the issuance of a temporary restraining order falls
precisely within the ambit of "extraordinary situations" requiring prompt action recognized by Fuentes.
Some difficulty is presented by CPLR 6401 as to notice requirements. The statute does
not indicate whether notice must be given prior to the appointment of a temporary receiver. See 7B McKzcnsy's CPLR 6401, commentary at 223 (1963). In any event, the statute
does not mandate a hearing prior thereto. CPLR 6401 does, however, require a showing of
danger that the property will be removed from the state, lost, materially injured, or de.
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Fuentes requires that the defendant receive notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard prior to any attachment of his property. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court will be afforded an opportunity
to balance the respective rights of the plaintiff and the defendant with
the aid of information supplied by both parties to the action.
The need for a complete legislative reevaluation of provisional
remedies can readily be seen as a priority of the first magnitude.
Fuentes v. Shevin requires nothing less. Respect for the constitutional
rights of the defendant and the availability of effective remedies for the
plaintiff are not concepts which are mutually exclusive. Within the
framework of Fuentes v. Shevin ample opportunity exists to strike a
balance equitable to both.
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(1)(b): Court incorporatesseparate proceeding against
insurance carrierinto underlying negligence action.
Section 167(l)(b) of the Insurance Law'9 6 allows an injured party
to bring a direct action against an insurer where a judgment against its
insured within the policy terms and limits remains unpaid thirty days
after notice of entry is served on the insured or his attorney and the
insurer.
In Brown v. Reid,1 7 after denying the defendants' motion to vacate
a default judgment entered against the owner and the operator of a
vehicle which struck the plaintiffs' vehicle from behind, the Supreme
Court, Nassau County, held that participation of insurance carriers in
the defense of the primary litigation obviated the need for a separate
section 167 proceeding. 198 Reasoning that the essential ingredients of
stroyed, and thus comes squarely within the Fuentes exception of a special situation demanding prompt action.
The filing of a notice of pendency under CPLR 6501 is constructive notice of the
pendency of an action in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the
possession, use or enjoyment of, real property. No application need be made to a court as
a condition precedent to the filing of the notice of pendency. While the notice of pendency
technically does not restrain the conveyance of real property, it serves as a severe deterrent
to a prospective buyer, and thus constitutes a significant limitation of the defendant's right
to free alienation of his property. Fuentes requires notice of a hearing before the defendant
is "deprived of any significant property interest . .. ." 407 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
While constructive notice is given by the filing of a notice of pendency, no opportunity to
challenge the action at a hearing exists prior thereto. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
a broad reading of Fuentes would seem to require that the defendant be given an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of a notice of pendency.
196 N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(l)(b) (McKinney 1966).
1'7 72 Misc. 2d 237, 339 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
198 Two insurers, the defendant-owner's carrier and the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). representing his uninsured driver, were involved in
the litigation from the beginning. The former disclaimed liability on the basis of the

